Secure untraceable off-line electronic cash system  by Baseri, Y. et al.
Scientia Iranica D (2013) 20 (3), 637–646
Sharif University of Technology
Scientia Iranica
Transactions D: Computer Science & Engineering and Electrical Engineering
www.sciencedirect.com
Secure untraceable off-line electronic cash system
Y. Baseri a,c,∗, B. Takhtaei b, J. Mohajeri a
a Institute of Electronics Research, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran
bData and Network Security Lab, Department of Computer Engineering, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran
cDepartment of Computer and Software Engineering, École Polytechnique de Montréal, Montréal, Québec, Canada
Received 25 May 2011; revised 23 June 2012; accepted 21 November 2012
KEYWORDS
Electronic cash;
Payment systems;
Untraceable;
Date attachable.
Abstract Eslami and Talebi (2011) [25] proposed an untraceable electronic cash scheme and claimed that
their scheme protects the anonymity of customers, detects the identity of double spenders and provides
the date attachability of coins to manage the bank database. In this paper, illustrating Eslami and Talebi’s
scheme, as one of the latest untraceable electronic cash schemes, and showing its weaknesses (in fulfilling
the properties of perceptibility of double spender, unforgeability and date attainability of coins) and its
faults (related to exchange protocol), we propose a new untraceable electronic cash scheme which is
immune to the weaknesses of the former. Our scheme contains anonymity, double-spending detection,
unforgeability and date attachability properties and prevents forging. To do this, we described a special
construction which injects the expiration date and the identity of the customer onto the coin and detects
the identity in the case of double spending. Lastly, we show that the efficiency of our scheme is comparable
with other schemes.
© 2013 Sharif University of Technology. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.
Open access under CC BY license. 1. Introduction
Nowadays, thanks to the progressing technology of com-
puter networks and the Internet, information technology is
used in many aspects of human life. One aspect is the use
of information technology in electronic commerce. Since the
appearance of electronic commerce, people have been able
to carry out their commercial activities by the use of elec-
tronic money in their payment transactions. The first electronic
money has been proposed by the David Chaum to have similar
properties to paper cash [1]. There are a number of features con-
sidered for an electronic cash system. Some of them are listed:
• Anonymity: There should not be any relationship between
the cash and its owner.
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anyone except authorized parties.
• Double spender perceptibility: The identity of malicious
spenders, who spend the cash twice or more, should be
revealed.
• Date attachability: Digital cash should contain the dates of
withdrawing, paying and depositing. These dates are used
to check the expiration date and charge for interest.
• Divisibility: Digital cash could be divided into smaller
amounts.
• Transferability: Digital coins can be circulated among
people.
• Anonymity revocation: While misusing or undertaking
illegal activities, the coin or its owner could be traced.
• Portability: The security and the use of digital cash is
not dependent on any physical location, but it could be
transferred through computer networks into storage devices
and vice versa.
In prevalent electronic cash systems, the bank, the customer
and the merchant are three participants involved in the
transaction cycle of the system. A customer opens an account
in a bank, withdraws cash from his account and then pays it
to a merchant. The merchant takes the cash, checks its validity,
accepts it and deposits it with the bank.
evier B.V. Open access under CC BY license. 
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merchant, electronic cash systems could be divided into
two categories: online and off-line. In online category, while
paying the coin to the merchant, the bank should attend the
transaction, validate the coin and check its double spending
[2–4]. In contrast, in off-line payments, the validation of the
coin is done partially by the merchant while paying. After
connecting to the bank in the next phase, the validation will be
completed. While efficiency is improved, double spending can
only be detected after connectingwith the bank [5–7]. Recently,
some efforts have been made to integrate online and off-line
electronic cash systems [8].
The main controversial issue in off-line electronic cash
systems is simultaneously fulfilling untraceability and double
spending detection. After the Chaum scheme which used
a blind signature to achieve untraceability [1], numerous
untraceable electronic cash schemes have been proposed based
on this structure [9–14]. In blind signature-based schemes,
the customer could get the signature of the bank on the coin
without disclosing any information about the coin, and spend it
without revealing his identity to the merchant. The other issue
in off-line electronic cash is related to the nature of electronic
cash. Since electronic cash is inherently digital, it could easily
be copied and reused. So, a malicious customer could spend
it twice or more. To address this problem, the identity of
the customer should be revealed after double spending. One
approach to doing this is the use of theCut and choose technique.
Although this technique is used in some schemes [14–16], due
to computational and communicational overhead, it is highly
inefficient. The other approach for detecting the identity of
a double spender is the use of a restrictive blind signature,
which is introduced by Bands [5]. In restrictive blind signature,
the customer can blind the outside of the message, m, but
not its internal structure. After double spending, the bank
would be able to clear the structure in a polynomial time.
Although Brands’ scheme suffers from some weaknesses in
misrepresenting the identity of the customer [17], some
solutions have been proposed to prevent these weaknesses [10,
17]. Afterward, some schemes have been presented, which use
a similar method to Bands’ restrictive blind signature, to detect
the identity of a double spender [18–20].
The other feature considered for an electronic cash system is
adding the withdrawal date, transaction date (or effective date)
and depositing date to it, in order to charge for interest and
check the expiration date of the coin. Since the electronic cash
systems are prepaid systems, the withdrawal and transaction
dates are important to the customers and merchants if e-cash
interest is considered. Using the transaction date, when the
merchant deposits the e-cash, he can charge the interest of
the e-cash during the transaction date and deposit date from
the bank. To attach the date, several date attachment schemes
have been proposed that let customers attach transaction dates
to e-cash [21–24], and some other date attachment e-cash
schemes let the merchant attach the date to the e-cash [5,25,
26]. In addition, to give the bank the ability of managing its
own database, the expiration date should be attached to the
coin. To detect the identity of a malicious spender while double
spending, the banks should store the information related to the
withdrawn coin in its own database. Regarding the expiration
date, the bank could remove the information of outdated coins
from its own database and control the size of it. Attaching
an expiration date to coins, should be considered a procedure
to exchange the outdated coins with new coins. This affair
is done by considering an additional phase in the electroniccash protocol (i.e. exchange phase) [25,27,28]. In addition, to
attach the expiration date, most schemes use partially blind
signatures [23,29–32]. In partially blind signatures, the part of
the information which contains pre-agreed information is clear
to the signer and verifier (e.g. date and time), while the other
parts of themassage and the signature are blinded to the signer.
Recently, Eslami and Talebi proposed an off-line electronic
cash scheme and claimed that their scheme satisfies the
requirements of the anonymity of customer, perceptibility of a
double spender, date attachability and portability of cash [25].
Their scheme is based on cryptographic primitives, such as the
ElGamal cryptosystem and blind signatures. However, as we
show in the paper, their scheme suffers from some weaknesses
in fulfilling the property of double spender perceptibility,
date attachability, and some other weaknesses related to their
exchange protocol.
In the rest of this paper, first, we review Eslami and Talebi’s
scheme and its weaknesses in Section 2. In Section 3, we
propose a new scheme, which is immune to the weaknesses
mentioned in the previous section. In the proposed scheme,
we use a construction to provide the anonymity of a customer
and to detect the identity of a double spender, which hides
the identity of customer in the construction and reveals it after
double spending. Furthermore, for attaching time to the coin,
we use a method that injects the expiration date of the coin
into the represented construction. Attempting to resist chosen
plaintext attacks, which are based on homomorphic property,
we insert an extra item, considering the addition of other items
talented to the attacks. In Section 4, we show our scheme is
immune to theweaknesses of Eslami and Talebi’s scheme. Next,
the security analysis of our scheme is presented in Section 5.We
also compare its performance with some other related schemes
in Section 6.
2. Eslami and Talebi’s scheme and its failures
In this section, first, we review Eslami and Talebi’s scheme.
Then, we show its weaknesses to satisfy the claimed properties.
2.1. Eslami and Talebi’s scheme
There are four participants in the scheme: a Central
Authority (CA), the Bank (B), the Spender (S) and the Merchant
(M). The protocol is done in five phases: initialization,
withdrawal, payment, deposit and exchange.
2.1.1. Initialization
In this phase, the central authority fixes some parameters
and certifies the public keys corresponding to the bank, spender
andmerchant. In this phase, the following steps are performed:
Step 1. The central authority, CA, selects a large prime, p, such
that q = (p − 1)/2 is also prime, α as the square
of a primitive root (mod p) and three public hash
functions, H , H0 and H1. Then, it publishes p, α, H ,
H0,H1.
Step 2. The bank selects its RSA parameters as (pB, qB, nB, eB,
dB), such that nB > p, chooses a secret identity num-
ber, x, computes z = αx (mod p) and publishes it.
Step 3. The spender selects its RSA parameters as (pS , qS , nS ,
eS , dS), where nS > p, m is an identity number and rm
is a random number. Then, it computes I = (H1(m ∥
αrm),m)eB (mod nB) and sends it besides αrm (mod p)
to the bank.
Step 4. The bank computes IdB (mod nB) to obtain m, and
stores m and αrm (mod p), along with the identity in-
formation of the spender (e.g., name, address, etc.) in
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calculates the following numbers:
• s = (m ∥ k) (mod p),
• v = αs (mod p),
• R = vx (mod p).
It also stores s, k, v, R in its database and sends
(veS , ReS ) to the spender.
Step 5. The merchant chooses an identification number IDM
and registers it with the bank.
2.1.2. Withdrawal
Giving a coin to the customer, the bank requires a proof
of identity (i.e. the digital certificate issued by CA), just as
when someone is withdrawing classical cash from an account.
All coins in the scheme have the same value. A coin will be
represented by a 6-tuple (u, g, A, r, A′′, t) of numbers that are
generated through the following steps:
Step 1. The spender decrypts veS , ReS with his private key,
dS , to obtain the numbers v and R. Then, he chooses
randomnumbers, e, l,β1,β2 and y, such that gcd(y, p−
1) = 1, gcd(l, nB) = 1, and gcd(β1, q) = 1. He
computes:
• u = αy (mod p),
• w = (R ∥ e),
• g = αw (mod p),
• A = vβ1αβ2 (mod p),
• c = β−11 H(u, g, A) (mod q),• a = AleB (mod nB),
and sends (a, c) to the bank.
Step 2. The bank selects t = (Date ∥ Time) as the expiration
date of the coin and computes:
• c ′ = cx+ s (mod q),
• A′ = (aH1(t))dB (mod nB) = l(AH1(t))dB (mod
nB).
Then, it sends (A′, c ′, t) to the spender.
Step 3. The spender computes:
• r = β1c ′ + β2 (mod q),• A′′ = l−1A′ (mod nB).
The coin (u, g, A, r, A′′, t) is now complete.
2.1.3. Payment
This phase includes the following steps:
Step 1. Spender sends (u, g, A, r, A′, t) to the merchant.
Step 2. The merchant checks the expiration date of the coin
and verifies the equationsαr ?= AzH(u,g,A) (mod p) and
AH1(t)
?= A′′eB (mod nB) to ensure the validity of the
coin. Then, he computes d = H0(u, g, IDM ,Date ∥
Time), where H0 is the hash function in the initial-
ization phase and Date and Time represent the date
and time of the transaction. Finally, he sends d to the
spender.
Step 3. The spender utilizes ElGamels scheme to compute γ ,
such that wu + yγ = d (mod p − 1), and sends γ to
the merchant.
Step 4. The merchant accepts the coin if guuγ = αd (mod p).
2.1.4. Deposit
In this phase, the following steps are performed:
Step 1. The merchant sends ((u, g, A, r, A′′, t), d, γ ) to the
bank.Step 2. The bank checks whether the coin (u, g, A, r, A′′, t)
exists in either the deposit table or the exchange
table, and skips to the Fraud Control procedure.
Otherwise, it checks if αr ?= AzH(u,g,A) (mod p) and
AH1(t)
?= A′′eB (mod nB).
If so, the coin is valid and the bank stores ((u, g, A, r, A′′, t), d,
γ ) into the deposit table and transfers money to the merchants
account.
In this phase, when the malicious spender spends the coin
twice, the bank would be able to detect the identity of the
malicious spender. Suppose that, first, merchant M deposits
the coin ((u, g, A, r, A′′, t) with the parameters d, γ ). When
the second merchant, V , wants to deposit the same coin
((u, g, A, r, A′′, t) with the extra parameters d′, γ ′) for the
second time, the bank finds out that the coin has already been
spent. The bank can use the property of the ElGamal signature
to identify the spender who has done this. Since y(γ − γ ′) =
(d−d′) (mod p−1), the bankwould be able to compute y. Now,
by the equation wu + y = d (mod p − 1), the bank can obtain
w and identify the malicious spender.
2.1.5. Exchange
In this phase, the bank exchanges only outdated coins which
are not in the deposit table or the exchange table. The owner of
such coins can present the coin to the bank and receive a new
coinwith an updated expiration date. The details are as follows.
Step 1. The owner presents his/her outdated coin, together
with I , to the bank, which checks (using a zero-
knowledge technique) if the owner knows the corre-
sponding rm and if the coin is valid. Now, a new coin
can be generated.
Step 2. The owner chooses random numbers and y′, such that
gcd(y′, p−1) = 1, gcd(l′, nB) = 1, and gcd(β ′, q) = 1.
Then, he computes u′,w′, g ′, A1, c ′, a′, as in Step 1.3 of
the withdrawal protocol and sends a′, c ′ to the bank.
Step 3. The bank computes c ′1, A
′
1, as done in the withdrawal
phase, and sends these numbers, along with t ′, to the
owner.
Step 4. The owner computes r ′ and A′′, as done in the
withdrawal phase of the protocol.
The new coin is now complete. The bank then updates the
exchange table. Note that when a coin enters this table, it
is considered invalid and no further transaction on it can be
performed.
2.2. Weaknesses of the scheme
In this subsection, we present some weaknesses of Eslami
and Talebi’s scheme and show that the scheme is vulnerable
to some claimed properties. The first fault is in detecting the
double spender’s identity. The second one is in validating the
expiration date of the coin, which results in violation of the
unforgeability of the coin. The third fault is related to the
exchange protocol.
2.2.1. First fault: attacking double spender detection
In this attack, misbehaving in the withdrawal protocol, the
customer can forge his identity in such a way that the bank
would not be able to identify him after double spending. As
mentioned in the setup phase, for each customer, the bank
stores the chosen parameters, m, αrm , s, k, v, R, besides his
identity. After double spending, the bank could detect the value
ofw for themalicious customer. Finding the value ofw, the bank
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to its database, the bank finds the identity of that customer.
So, when the value of w is forged, the bank would not be
able to detect the identity of the malicious spender. Since the
correctness of the value of w = (R ∥ e) has not been checkd
anywhere, the customer would be able to change the value of R
with arbitrary forged value R′ in Zq, and, consequently, change
the values of w, g and r with proper values w′, g ′ and r ′ in the
withdrawal phase (Figure 1).
Accordingly, in the payment phase, the values of d and r
would be computed corresponding to the new forged values
and the validation of the Elgamal signature employed in the
payment phase will be satisfied (Figure 2).
By these changes, the bank could not verify the identity of
the malicious spender. This coin passes through all validations
in the withdrawal and payment phases. In addition, since the
value of (w)′ is imitative,when amalicious customer spends the
coinmore than one time, the bank calculates (w)′ instead of his
real parameter ofw. So, it could not calculate his real identity.
2.2.2. Second fault: forging the expiration date
In this attack, withdrawing the coin, a malicious customer
can manipulate the expiration date of the received coin. Since
in the coin (u, g, A, r, A′′, t), the expiration date is authorized
only by A′′, fixing the value of A and modifying the values of
A′′ and t in a proper way, the coin can be changed in such a
way that it remains valid in the time, except time t . Suppose
that the customer follows the withdrawal protocol two times
with the sameparameter,A. By that, the customer canwithdraw
two eligible coins (u1, g1, A, r1, A′′1, t1) and (u2, g2, A, r2, A
′′
2, t2)
from his account in which t2 > t1. Replacing the values of A′′1, t1
with corresponding values of the second coin (i.e. A′′2, t2), the
customer can forge the first coin in such a way that it is valid
for time t2 (Figure 3). This coin passes through the validation of
payment phase (Figure 4).
2.2.3. Third fault: frauds on exchange protocol
Wallet scatting and thieving problem is one of the important
problems of electronic wallets. Some solutions have been
offered to solve this problem [20,33]. In Eslami and Talebi’s
protocol, without considering the exchange protocol, it is not
possible to pay a coin without having information about the
secret parameters, w and y. However, regarding the exchange
protocol, a malicious customer can refer to the bank with his
own real identity, exchange the thieved coin with a new coin
and spend it. This problem is caused by the fact that in the first
step of the exchange protocol, the bank only checks the identity
of the possessor of the coin and validity of the coin, yet does not
check the dependency of the coin on the possessor.Also, in most cases, the loser does not have the information
of the coin and, consequently, could not file a lawsuit in court.
Even by knowing the information of the coin, he should prove
his ownership of the coin, which is notmentioned in Eslami and
Talebi’s protocol.
The other problem of the exchange phase in Eslami and
Talebi’s protocol is related to the size of database. They claimed
that by the proposed exchange protocol, they would be able
to manage the size of database. However, since their scheme
stores the information of all exchanged outdated coins in an
exchange table, it could not avoid database size increase. As
mentioned in [29,34], the main aim of inserting validation time
into the coin is discarding the information of outdated coins and
controlling the size of the database, while they did not consider
this note.
3. The proposed scheme
There are four participants in the scheme: a Central
Authority (CA), the Bank (B), the Spender (S) and the
Merchant (M). The scheme contains five phases: initialization,
withdrawal, payment, deposit and exchange.
Note that in the scheme, we use the RSA cryptosystem,
which is based on the difficulty of the computation of e’th
root of numbers in Z∗n , such that n = p ∗ q and p, q are
two large prime numbers. The public key of the system is
e, a reasonably large prime, and the corresponding private
key is 1/e (mod φ(n)). Ciphertexts can be computed as the
e’th exponent of plaintexts (encryption) and the e’th root of
ciphertexts can be computed as the planetexts (decryption).
Everyone who knows the factorization of n is able to compute
the e’th root of numbers in Z∗n and, consequently, is able to
decrypt ciphertexts. This type of RSA deployment has been used
in some other protocols such as Ferguson’s protocol [35].
The other note which should be mentioned here is that for
attaching time to the coin, we use a method that injects the
expiration date of the coin into the power of some parameters.
Although similar RSA-based methods have been presented to
attach the time to the structure of the signature, such as
the schemes proposed by Abe and Fujisaki [29] and by Cao
et al.’s [30], it is shown that their schemes are vulnerable to
some homomorphic-based attacks ([36–38], respectively). To
be immune to to these attacks, we insert extra items into
the coin, considering the addition of the other two essential
parameters. By that, we protect our protocol against the
mentioned attacks and enhance the security of the scheme.
3.1. Initialization
In this phase, which could be enumerated as the set up
phase, the central authority should set some public parameters.
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g2, of the same large prime order, l in Z∗n , and a one-way
hash function, H . In addition, each authenticated participant
involved in the system should determine his own parameters
and get a certificate for its own public key from certification
authority. The required parameters of the bank are two RSA
public/private key pairs (i.e. ((eB, n), 1/eB) and ((e′B, n), 1/e
′
B)
such that eB > e′B). Using two RSA key pairs for the bank, we
enhance the security of the system and prevent some security
attacks based on the homomorphic property.
3.2. Opening an account
To open an account, the customer should identify himself
to the bank. Authenticating the customer, the bank stores his
identity information in its account database. By that, while
double spending occurs, the bank would be able to determine
the u parameter of the offender, compute gu1 , refer to its
database and reveal the identity of the offender. This process
is done in the following steps:
Step 1. The customer:
(a) Identifies himself bymeans of official documents,
like a passport or some other identification.
(b) Generates a random number, u∈R Z∗n , and keeps
it as his own secret identity information which is
unknown to any other, unless he spends a coin
more that one time.
(c) Computes:
• IDC = gu1 (mod n) as his identity, such that
gu1g2 ≠ 1 (mod n).
(d) Sends IDC to the bank.(e) Provides a zero knowledge proof that he knows
the discrete logarithm of IDC , with respect to g1.
Step 2. The bank B:
(a) Checks the identity and the zero knowledge proof
offered by the customer.
(b) Stores the identity information of the customer in
the account database.
(c) Computes A and O1 as its own signature on A:• A = IDC g2 (mod n),• O1 = A1/eB (mod n).
(d) Sends A and O1 to the customer.
3.3. Withdrawal
Before withdrawing and asking for a coin, the spender
should prove his/her ownership of the account to the bank.
The spender should prove his identity in a similar way to the
withdrawal of classical cash from an account (i.e. by offering
his passport or driving license). In addition, he should refer to
a bulletin board in which the bank periodically publishes the
fresh time by two parameters, t and eB ∗ t (mod φ(n)). Time t is
constant during the period and used to synchronize customers
and the bank in the withdrawing process and to determine the
validation time of coins. Note that t∗eB plays the role of a public
key for the bank and is chosen in such away that its reverse (i.e.
1/(eB∗t) (mod ϕ(n))) exists. (Abe and Fujisaki [29] introduced a
method to choose constant t such that ((1/(eB∗t)) (mod φ(n)))
exists.) The coin is represented by a five-tuple (A′, B, s1, s2, s3)
constructed in the following steps (Figure 5):
Step 1. The spender S:
(a) Chooses three random numbers, x1, x2 ∈R Z∗e′B and
s∈R Z∗n , and two blinding factors, b1, b2 ∈ Z∗n .
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• A′ = As (mod n),
• B = gx11 gx22 (mod n),
• w1 = Bbe
′
B
1 (mod n),
• w2 = (A′ + B)b(eB∗t)2 (mod n).
(c) Sendsw1, w2, t to the bank.
Step 2. The bank B:
(a) Checks the validity of the Date/Time slip.
(b) Signsw1, andw2 by computing:
• O2 = w1/e
′
B
1 (mod n),
• O3 = w1/(eB∗t)2 (mod n).
(c) Sends O2 and O3 to the spender.
Step 3. The spender S:
(a) Verifies the signatures of the bank on A,w1,w2.
(b) Obtains the signatures of the bank on A′, B and
A′ + B, which are signed with private keys 1/eB,
1/e′B and (1/(eB ∗ t)), respectively:• s1 = Os1 (mod n) = signB(A′),• s2 = O2/b1 (mod n) = signB(B),• s3 = O3/b2 (mod n) = signB(A′ + B).
The Coin is (A′, B, s1, s2, s3, t).3.4. Payment
When the customer wants to spend his coin at the shop, the
following steps are done (Figure 6):
Step 1. The spender S:
(a) Sends A′, B, s1, s2, s3, t to the merchantM .
Step 2. The merchantM:
(a) Verifies if A′ ≠ 0.
(b) Checks the expiration date of the coin.
(c) Verifies the signatures, s1, using the public key, eB,
s2 using the public key, e′B and s3, and using the
public key (eB ∗ t).
(d) Computes:
• The challenge d = H(A′, B, IDM , date ∥ time)
in whichH is the hash function determined in
the initialization phase, IDM is the identity of
the merchant and date ∥ time represents the
date and time of the transaction.
(e) Sends d to the spender.
Step 3. The spender S:
(a) Computes:
• r1 = dus+ x1 (mod eB),• r2 = ds+ x2 (mod eB).
(b) Sends r1 and r2 to the merchant.
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(a) Accepts the coin if g r11 g
r2
2 = A′dB.
3.5. Deposit
In this phase, the followingprocess is donebetween the bank
B and the merchantM (Figure 7):
Step 1. The merchantM:
(a) Sends the transcript of each electronic coin (i.e.
Coin, r1, r2) to the bank.
Step 2. The bank B:
(a) Checks the authenticity of the merchant and
verifies the transcript of the received coin.
(b) Checks whether the coin exists in its deposit or
exchange tables or not.
(i) If the coin exists, it runs the double spender
detection procedure,
(ii)Else, accepts the coin, stores it in the deposit
table and transfers money to the merchant.
3.5.1. Double spender detection procedure
Suppose that a malicious spender spends the same coin
twice or more. Suppose that the malicious spender first spends
the coin, alongwith d, r1 and r2. When the customer spends that
coin for the second time (with the same parameters A′ and B)
along with d′, r ′1 and r
′
2, the bank finds out that the coin already
exists in its tables. At that time, using the relation between r1, r2,
d and consequently between r ′1, r
′
2, d
′, it computes the identity
of the malicious spender by the following equations:
• u = r1−r ′1r2−r ′2 (mod eB),• IDC = gu1 (mod nB).
3.6. Exchange
In this phase, referring to the bank, the customer can
exchange his old coin (which is not outdated) with new coins
and update the expiration date of his own coin. To control the
size of its database, the bank should remove the information of
outdated coins from its database. This affair is undertaken by
the following procedure (Figure 8):
Step 1. The Customer:
(a) Offers his coin, besides his identity, to the bank.
Step 2. The Bank B:
(a) Checks deposit and exchange tables to ensure that
the coin has not already been exchanged or spent.(b) Checks the authenticity of the customer and veri-
fication of the coin similar to the validation check-
ing of the payment phase.
(c) Runs the withdrawal phase of the protocol.
(d) Updates the exchange table by inserting the infor-
mation of the customer and the old coin.
4. Immunity to the proposed attacks
As shown in Section 2.2, we enumarate some weaknesses
and faults of Eslami and Talebi’s scheme, which are related
to detecting the identity of a double spender, validating the
expiration date and the fault related to the exchange protocol.
In this section, we show howwe immune our proposed scheme
to these weaknesses and faults.
The first fault is related to detecting the double spender’s
identity. In our scheme, to spend the coin, Coin = (A′, B, s1, s2,
s3, t), more than one time, amalicious spender has two options:
Using his own identity, or using a forged identity.
1. If he uses his own identity (the A or Ak), he should compute
r1 and r2 parameters in the payment phase in such away that
equation g r11 g
r2
2 = A′dB holds. Since:
A′dB = ((Ak)s)dB = AdksB
= (gu1g2)dks(gx11 gx22 )
= gduks+x11 gdks+x22 (mod n),
then:
• r1 = duks+ x1 (mod eB),
• r2 = dks+ x2 (mod eB).
So, in the case of double spending, the values of r ′1 and r
′
2 (the
related values of r1 and r2 for the second time) should be:• r ′1 = d′uks+ x1 (mod eB),• r ′2 = d′ks+ x2 (mod eB).
Now, the bank would be able to detect the identity of the
double spender in the way described in Section 3.5.
2. If the malicious spender, misbehaving in the withdrawal
protocol, chooses a forged identity in the form of Aforged ≠
Ak for himself, he should provide the signature of the bank
on Asforged, as the first parameter of the coin (i.e. s1). So, he
could provide the RSA signature of the bank on new values
(i.e. Asforged) and this will contradict the security of the RSA
cryptosystem.
The second fault is on validating the expiration date of the
coin. Since the structure of our coin(its parameters) is different
from the former, this attack is not applicable to our scheme.
The third fault is related to the exchange protocol. One part
of the problem is caused by the fact that in the first step of
the exchange protocol, the bank only checks the identity of the
possessor of the coin and validity of the coin, yet does not check
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scheme, to forbid the exchange of the stolen coin with the new
coin, the bank performs the required validations (related to
coin validation and customer’s authentication) in the exchange
phase of the protocol. The other part of the problem is related
to the size of the database. Removing the information of the
expired coins, the bank would be able to manage the size of its
own database.
5. Security discussion
In this section, first, we represent some assumptions used
to analyze the properties of the protocol. Then, we discuss
the satisfaction of anonymity, double spender detection and
unforgeability properties using our protocol. Achieving these
properties is related to the hardness of the RSA cryptosystem,
the Discrete Logarithm problem and the Representation
problem. Finally, we conduct a security comparison between
our scheme, Eslami and Talebi scheme and some other
electronic cash scheme.
5.1. Assumptions
Assumption 1 (RSA Assumption). Given RSA module N as
multiplication of the two prime elements, p and q, random
element, y ∈ Z∗N and the element, e > 1, such that
gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1. It is hard to compute the message x such that
xe = y (mod N) using input 3-tuple (y,N, e) [39].
Assumption 2 (DL Assumption).Given a large group,G, of order
p, a generator g and a random element, h ∈ G. It is hard to find
an integer, a ∈ Z∗p such that h = ga.
Assumption 3 (Representation Assumption). Given a large
group, G, of order p and a k-tuple (g1, . . . , gk) and random ele-
ment, h. It is hard to compute a tuple (a1, . . . , ak), as represen-
tation of h, with respect to the k-tuple (g1, . . . , gk), such thatk
i=1 g
ai
i = h [5].
5.2. Anonymity
An e-cash scheme is anonymous, if no one can reveal the
identity of the payer. Hence, to prove this property, it is required
to show that the information of payment does not reveal any
knowledge about the identity of the customer who got the coin
in withdrawal phase.
The information achieved in the spending phase of the
protocol includes the parameters of coin (i.e. (A′, B, s1, s2, s3, t))and extra information offered by the spender to the merchant
(i.e. r1 and r2). Since in the withdrawal phase, while getting
the signatures of the bank on coin parameters, B and A′ + B
(i.e. s2 and s3), the parameters were blinded by blinding factors
b1 and b2, they give no information to the adversary. Although
A′ = As and s1 = Os1 parameters lose their relations with A and
O1 by random parameter, s. In addition, parameter B = gx11 gx22
seems random in the view of the adversary and finding x1 and
x2 are hard (due to the hardness of RP problem). Finally, in the
payment phase, while signing the response to the challenging
parameter d, by r1 and r2, we have an equation system with
two equations and four unknown parameters. So, it gives no
information to the adversary.
5.3. Double spender detection
As we have shown in Section 3.5.1, in the case of double
spending, the bank would be able to detect the u parameter
of a malicious spender by equation u = r1−r ′1r2−r ′2 (mod eB) and
consequently find his identity using IDC = gu1 (mod nB). To
disrupt the computations, the adversary should either employ
a forged identity or misbehave in providing the values of r1 and
r2. Considering different phases of the scheme, the adversary
could undertake these affairs in one of the following scenarios:
1. In the account opening phase, the customer chooses his
identity in a way different from IDC = gu11 . As we discussed
in Section 3.2, he should provide a zero knowledge proof
to the bank that he knows the discrete logarithm of IDC
in the base of g1. To provide the zero knowledge proof,
the malicious customer should be able to solve the discrete
logarithm problem.
2. In the withdrawal phase, the customer uses an identity
different from his real identity. Since the bank has signed
the parameter A = IDC g2 for his real identity IDC (i.e.
O1 = signB(A)), the customer only accesses the signature
of the bank on his real identity, unless he is able to forge the
RSA signature of the bank. Moreover, due to considering the
signature of the bank on A, B and additive parameter A′ + B
using different private keys, it is impossible to forge extraO1.
3. In the payment phase, the customer uses an identity
different from his real identity in computing r1 and r2. Since
in equation g r11 g
r2
2 = A′dB, the value of A′ includes the real
identity of the spender, employing different identity u in
computing r1, the equation does not hold.
So, in none of the steps of the protocol, could the adversary use
the forged identity for himself. Consequently, if he spent more
than once, his identity would be revealed.
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Juang Martínez-Peláez et al. Eslami and Talebi Our scheme
Anonymity ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Unforgeability ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Double spender detection ✓ ✓ × ✓
Date attachability × ✓ × ✓Table 2: C1: computation cost of the withdrawing and spending for spender, C2: computation cost of the withdrawing for the bank, C3: computation cost of the
verifying e-coin for merchant, C4: communication cost of withdrawing an e-coin (bits), C5: transaction mode.
Juang Martínez-Peláez et al. Eslami and Talebi Our scheme
C1 3E+6M 2E+5H 5E+9M+1H 6E+8M
C2 1E+2M 1E 1E+2M+1H 2E+1M
C3 2E+2M 2H 6E+3M+2H 6E+2M+1H
C4 2528 2152 2368 4256
C5 Off-line On-line Off-line Off-line5.4. Unforgeability
An e-cash scheme is unforgeable, if no one could create
valid coins by a means other than withdrawing them from
the bank. Suppose that the adversary A wants to forge a coin
Coin = (A′, B, s1, s2, s3, t). To do that, it should change one
of the parameters, A′ and B, and properly change the values of
s1 = signB(A′), s2 = signB(B), and s3 = signB(A′ + B). The
adversary can do one of the following three scenarios:
1. To forge A′ and related signature (i.e. s1)A can either power
both of them with the same value or use a homomorphic
property and construct their new value using the corre-
sponding value of two or more coins. In both cases,Awould
not be able to generate the valid RSA signature of the bank
on A′ + B.
2. To forge B and related signature (i.e. s2), in a similar way, it
could be shown that due to the dependency of the value of
A′+ B on B, forging the value of Bwithout the ability to gen-
erate the RSA signature is impossible.
3. The only remaining way is by choosing a new value for both
A′ andB, such that their addition (i.e.A′+B) is left unchanged.
Due to the hardness of discrete logarithm and representa-
tion problems, it is hard to find the requisite value, u, x1, x2
(which is required for paying) corresponding to new values
of A′ and B.
5.5. Security properties comparison
In Table 1, we conduct a security comparison between our
proposed scheme, Eslami and Talebi’s scheme [25], Juang’s
scheme [40], and Martínez-Peláez et al.’s scheme [31] in which
we consider anonymity, unforgeability, double spender detection
and date attachability.
6. Performance comparison
In Table 2, we compare the computational and communi-
cational complexity of our scheme, Eslami and Talebi’s scheme
and some other related schemes. For security consideration, the
schemes suppose some computational and communicational
assumptions: As [41,42], we assume that n is 1024 bites and eB
and e′B are 160 bites. The assumptions about the size of param-
eters used in the compared schemes are similar to Eslami and
Talebi’s assumptions. We also assume that H is the computa-
tion time of one hashing operation, M is the computation timeof one modular multiplication in a 1024-bit operation and E is
the computation time of one modular exponential operation in
a 1024-bit operation.
We conduct a comparison between our scheme, Eslami and
Talebi’s scheme [25], Juang’s scheme [40] and Martínez-Peláez
et al.’s scheme [31] in which we consider (1) the computation
cost of the withdrawing and spending for the Spender, (2) the
computation cost of the withdrawing for the Bank, (3) the
computation cost of the verifying e-coin for the Merchant,
(4) the communication cost of withdrawing an e-coin (bits),
(5) the transaction mode of communication. It should be noted
that on-line schema have lower costs of computation, but they
have more limitations than off-line schema.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we considered one of the latest untraceable
electronic cash protocols and showed its weaknesses. Further-
more, we contributed an electronic cash scheme which is im-
mune to the weaknesses of Eslami and Talebi’s scheme. Our
scheme satisfies anonymity, double-spending detection, un-
forgeability, date-attachability properties and prevents forging
coins. To do this, we contributed a special structure which in-
jects the expiration date and the identity of the customer into
the coin and detects its identity in the case of double spending.
We also showed that the efficiency of our scheme is comparable
with other schemes. The security of the new protocol was also
considered.
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